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Abstract
Background: Disease transmission patterns are needed to inform public health interventions, but remain largely unknown
for avian influenza H5N1 virus infections. A recent study on the 139 outbreaks detected in Indonesia between 2005 and
2009 found that the type of exposure to sources of H5N1 virus for both the index case and their household members
impacted the risk of additional cases in the household. This study describes the disease transmission patterns in those
outbreak households.
Methodology/Principal Findings: We compared cases (n = 177) and contacts (n = 496) in the 113 sporadic and 26 cluster
outbreaks detected between July 2005 and July 2009 to estimate attack rates and disease intervals. We used final size
household models to fit transmission parameters to data on household size, cases and blood-related household contacts to
assess the relative contribution of zoonotic and human-to-human transmission of the virus, as well as the reproduction
number for human virus transmission. The overall household attack rate was 18.3% and secondary attack rate was 5.5%.
Secondary attack rate remained stable as household size increased. The mean interval between onset of subsequent cases
in outbreaks was 5.6 days. The transmission model found that human transmission was very rare, with a reproduction
number between 0.1 and 0.25, and the upper confidence bounds below 0.4. Transmission model fit was best when the
denominator population was restricted to blood-related household contacts of index cases.
Conclusions/Significance: The study only found strong support for human transmission of the virus when a single large
cluster was included in the transmission model. The reproduction number was well below the threshold for sustained
transmission. This study provides baseline information on the transmission dynamics for the current zoonotic virus and can
be used to detect and define signatures of a virus with increasing capacity for human-to-human transmission.
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Introduction
The avian influenza (AI) H5N1 virus remains of international
public health concern due to its pandemic potential. Based on
analyses of AI H5N1 outbreaks during 2003 to 2009, most cases
were sporadic and had documented exposure to zoonotic sources
of the virus [1]. For clusters of AI H5N1 infection, the majority
occurred in people who were genetically related to each other and
most also had exposure to zoonotic (bird to human) sources of
virus [1]. Studies suggest that human transmission of the virus
occurred in a very limited way in some clusters [2,3]. However, the
transmission patterns remain largely unknown.
Quantification of transmission patterns such as the probability
of both human and zoonotic transmission of the H5N1-virus, the
reproduction number (R0), secondary attack rates (SAR) and the
interval between case onsets are important parameters to inform
preparedness and response measures to outbreaks, especially to
signal events that indicate changed virus behavior [4]. It is also
crucial that both zoonotic and human infection pathways are
considered, and results are interpreted in the context of a zoonotic
infection with limited transmission among humans [5,6]. Models
that incorporate both the zoonotic and human transmission
components are rare [5].
As of July 30, 2009, Indonesia had reported 139 outbreaks of
avian influenza (AI) H5N1 infection in humans with a case fatality
rate of 85% [7]. The epidemiology of Indonesia’s cases has been
reported previously [8–10]. A recent study on the 139 outbreaks
assessed the risk factors for household clustering of cases and the
risk factors for who in the household is likely to become a
secondary case of H5N1-infection [11]. The study found that the
type of exposure to sources of H5N1 for both the index case and
their household members impacted the risk of additional cases in
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the household. The study also added evidence that H5N1 infection
may be dependent on host genetic susceptibility since first-degree
blood relatives to index cases were at greater risk of becoming
secondary cases. However, this study did not assess the attack rates
(AR), SAR or transmission parameters in those outbreak
households.
To date, only one study has estimated the transmission patterns
based on case data in Indonesia [4]. Estimates generated were
solely based on one outbreak – a cluster of one probable and seven
confirmed cases detected in North Sumatra in 2006. The study
found statistical evidence of human-to-human transmission and
estimated SAR at 29% and R0 at 1.14 [4]. Since data on the total
persons exposed and individual factors such as exposure type were
not fully available to that study, the transmission pathways were
not investigated in detail. Also, since the model was fitted and
transmission estimates generated based only on that one cluster,
which is considered atypical due to its large size, the estimates are
likely to be an over-estimate for outbreaks in Indonesia.
Since Indonesia’s cumulative AI H5N1 infection case count
represents one-third of the world’s cases, the outbreak transmission
patterns are of international importance. Building on previous
findings about the epidemiology of H5N1 infection in households
[11], we describe infection AR, infection SAR, risk factors for
H5N1 infection and intervals between case illness onsets. We then
estimate transmission parameters and quantify the relative
contribution of zoonotic and human transmission as well as the
extent to which the virus was transmissible between people
(reproduction number). While international data suggest most
transmission is zoonotic, there is also some evidence of human-to-
human transmission [2,12]. We fitted household models to the
Indonesian data that allow for both zoonotic and human-to-
human transmission to assess the extent of transmission from each
source and to provide an estimate of the reproduction number in
the case that human-to-human transmission occurs.
Results
A total of 139 outbreaks of human AI H5N1 infection were
detected in Indonesia in the four year study period. There were
113 sporadic case outbreaks and 26 cluster outbreaks. The total
number of cases was 177, with 64 cases in the 26 clusters. Only
one cluster had over four cases; the North Sumatran cluster of
2006, which can be considered an outlier based on its large size of
seven confirmed and one probable case. There were 535
household contacts to index cases in the study, of which blood
relation was known for 94% (n= 503). Most of the 503 contacts
were blood relatives (n = 383, 76%) and 120 (24%) were non-blood
relatives. None of the non-blood related household contacts
became secondary cases.
Household Study
For the 80 outbreaks for which household and contact data
were available, the proportion of cluster to sporadic outbreaks
increased as household size increased (Table 1). To highlight the
impact of the outlier cluster on the AR and SAR, findings are
presented both including and excluding that cluster. The overall
AR was 17.8% (103 cases / 579 exposed) when the outlier cluster
was excluded and 18.3% (111 cases / 607 exposed) when included.
There was a stable SAR between 3.1–4.5% across household size
(Table 1). However, inclusion of the outlier cluster inflated SAR
for households with.15 persons to 12.5% (Table 1). These
findings are consistent with predominantly zoonotic virus
transmission. In the absence of human transmission, and with
low levels of zoonotic transmission, the AR would be expected to
decline with household size, while the SAR should remain roughly
constant.
Cases (nz = 177) and healthy contacts (n = 496) were compared
to assess risk factors for infection (Table 2). Young age groups (#
30 years) were at increased risk of infection, where individuals
between five and 17 years of age had 3.5 times the odds to be
infected when compared with those .30 years of age [Adjusted
Odds Ratio (aOR) = 3.44, 95% Confidence Interval (CI)) 1.86–
6.36]. Most cases (87%) and their healthy contacts (69%) had
zoonotic exposure. However, direct exposure to zoonotic sources
of AI H5N1 virus tripled the odds of infection (aOR=3.08, 95%
CI 1.54–6.13). Lastly, small households (1–5 persons) were
significantly more likely to have cases than households with .5
people (Table 2). The final multivariate model with three variables
had good fit (p = 0?17).
In cluster outbreaks, the median interval between the index case
onset and secondary case onset of illness was 8 days (range 1–21
days, Figure 1A). The median interval between the onset of illness
of a secondary case and the previous case in the same outbreak
was 6 days (range 1–12 days, Figure 1B). Based on the
investigation reports, eleven secondary cases had inconclusive
exposure to a zoonotic source of virus. All of these had onset of
illness at least two days after the index case’s onset of illness. For
these 11 cases, the median interval between illness onset of serial
cases was 8 days (range 2–11 days, Figure 1B).
Table 1. Household size and secondary attack rate for outbreaks of avian influenza H5N1 infection.
Contact data
Household
size Outbreak size (confirmed and probable cases)
Total
outbreaks
Proportion
cluster
Total
contacts
Secondary
cases SAR
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Available 1–5 27 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 32 0.16 152 9 0.059
6–10 25 6 2 0 0 0 0 0 35 0.24 219 8 0.036
11–15 8 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 12 0.33 85 3 0.035
.15 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 1.00 69 9 0.130a
Sub-total 60 15 3 1 0 0 0 1 80 0.24 525 29 0.055b
Not available 53 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 59 0.10 - 6 -
Total 113 20 4 1 0 0 0 1 139 0.19 - 35 -
aSAR declines to 0.047 when outlier cluster is excluded.
bSAR declines to 0.044 when outlier cluster is excluded.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029971.t001
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Table 2. Comparison of cases (n = 177) and healthy contacts (n = 496) in outbreaks of avian influenza H5N1 infection.
Univariate Multivariate a
Variable Cases, n (%)
Healthy
contacts, n (%)
OR
(P-value)
Adjusted OR
(P-value) 95% CI
Age groups (years) b
0–4 18 (10) 41 (9) 2.66 (0.004) 3.18 (0.004) 1.45–6.98
5–17 65 (37) 96 (21) 4.11 (,0.001) 3.44 (,0.001) 1.86–6.36
18–30 61 (35) 125 (28) 2.96 (,0.001) 3.20 (,0.001) 1.81–5.68
.30 31 (18) 188 (42) Reference group - -
Sex
Male 83(47) 225 (47) 0.99 (0.94)
Female 94 (53) 258 (53)
Exposure
Direct zoonotic 81 (46) 130 (26) 4.02 (0.002) 3.08 (0.001) 1.54–6.13
Indirect zoonotic 72 (41) 211 (43) 2.20 (,0.001) 1.43 (0.29) 0.72–2.81
Inconclusive zoonotic 24 (13) 155 (31) Reference group - -
Household size (persons) c
1–5 51 (46) 143 (29) Reference group - -
6–10 38 (34) 211 (43) 0.51 (0.009) 0.50 (,0.001) 0.34–0.73
11–15 10 (9) 82 (16) 0.35 (0.001) 0.32 (,0.001) 0.18–0.57
.15 12 (11) 60 (12) 0.51 (0.07) 0.40 (0.16) 0.11–1.43
aObservations = 561, Goodness-of-fit test: P = 0.17, OR denotes odds ratio, CI denotes confidence interval. OR were adjusted for the inclusion of the three variables in
the final multivariate model.
bData missing for two cases and 46 healthy contacts.
cData missing for 66 cases from the 59 outbreaks for which household data were not available.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029971.t002
Figure 1. Interval between onset of illness for cases (n=34) in outbreaks of avian influenza H5N1 infection. Panel A shows the interval
between onsets of illness of index and secondary cases in outbreaks. Panel B shows the interval between onsets of illness of serial cases in outbreaks.
Black denotes cases not exposed to zoonotic sources of virus and white denotes cases exposed to zoonotic sources of virus.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029971.g001
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Transmission Model
To assess the exposure of secondary cases, Table 3 presents the
transmission analysis comparing three model types: all transmis-
sion from zoonotic sources (Model A), all transmission was human
transmission (Model B) and transmission was from both zoonotic
and human sources (Model C). Two denominator populations are
presented for comparison; all exposed individuals in outbreaks and
all exposed blood-related household members to index cases. The
final column of the tables shows the percentage support for the
models, which can be interpreted as the probability that the model
is the best among those considered. To highlight the impact of the
outlier cluster on transmission parameters and model selection,
findings for two datasets are presented; one with the outlier cluster
included and one with it excluded.
Regardless of the denominator population or the dataset, there
was much less support for Model A (zoonotic transmission only)
than either Models B (human transmission only) or C (combina-
tion of zoonotic and human transmission) (Table 3). This was
confirmed by a simulation-based test of model fit, which
demonstrated significant differences between Model A and the
data (p,0.01 for both). Despite significant evidence that human
transmission occurred when the outlier cluster was included in the
analysis, estimated human transmission rates were low with the
reproduction number lying between 0.1 and 0.25, and the upper
confidence bounds all below 0.4 for an exposed population of five
individuals. Estimated zoonotic transmission rates ranged from 0
to 0.38 cases in an exposed population of five household members.
When the analysis excluded the outlier cluster (Table 3), similar
estimates for the human transmission parameters and the
reproduction number were found, but there was no longer
significant evidence of human transmission. Indeed, the model
with the strongest support was Model A (zoonotic transmission
only), with 0.31 zoonotic cases infected in an exposed population
of five household members. This suggests that the main evidence
for human transmission comes from the outlier cluster. For all
model types, both including and excluding the outlier cluster, use
of blood-related household members as the denominator popula-
tion provided better model fit. A test of the sensitivity of our results
to the households in which contact data were missing found very
little change to the transmission estimates, with estimates of
zoonotic transmission parameters reduced by around 0.05–0.1
cases in an exposed population of size 5, point estimates of human
transmission parameters largely unchanged, and a decrease in the
upper bound of the human transmission parameter of 0.02–0.08
cases in an exposed population of size 5.
Discussion
This study is the first globally to examine AI H5N1 transmission
patterns in households for a large number of outbreaks aimed at
quantifying human-to-human transmission of the AI H5N1 virus.
The study had three main findings. Firstly, most cases of AI H5N1
infection were a result of exposure to zoonotic sources of virus. In
fact, the study only found strong support for human transmission
of the virus when a single large cluster was included in the
transmission model. Secondly, the overall SAR was 5.5% in the 80
outbreaks for which household contact data were available. This
was much lower than previous estimates [4]. Thirdly, the study
adds evidence that blood relatives are at greatest risk of becoming
secondary cases in outbreak households. This adds support to the
hypothesis that there is an element of genetic susceptibility to AI
H5N1 infection [3].
The finding that the AI H5N1 virus does not transmit efficiently
between humans and that infection remains primarily zoonotic
impacts the interpretation of the interval between case onsets and
the SAR. These parameters should not be interpreted as human-
to-human transmission parameters. Rather, the interval between
case onsets (median 6 days, range 1–12 days) represents observed
timelines between human cases during an epizootic and indicates
Table 3. Transmission parameters for outbreaks of avian influenza H5N1 infection.
Data
Denominator
population Model description
Mean human transmission
cases a (95% CI)
Mean zoonotic infected
cases b (95% CI)
AICC percent
support c
80 outbreaks (North
Sumatra cluster
included)
All exposed
individuals
A) Only zoonotic transmission - 0.276 (0.126, 0.476) 0.1
B) Only human transmission 0.172 (0.026, 0.322) - 6.3
C) Full model 0.115 (0.009, 0.315) 0.094 (0.000, 0.344) 4.4
All exposed blood-
relatives
A) Only zoonotic transmission - 0.385 (0.185, 0.635) 2.2
B) Only human transmission 0.231 (0.082, 0.382) - 42.9
C) Full model 0.140 (0.004, 0.390) 0.157 (0.000, 0.452) 44.0
79 outbreaks (North
Sumatra cluster
excluded)
All exposed
individuals
A) Only zoonotic transmission - 0.221 (0.071, 0.421) 5.1
B) Only human transmission 0.166 (0.024, 0.316) - 2.4
C) Full model 0.052 (0.000, 0.302) 0.158 (0.000, 0.403) 2.5
All exposed blood-
relatives
A) Only zoonotic transmission - 0.310 (0.110, 0.510) 53.3
B) Only human transmission 0.227 (0.077, 0.427) - 14.0
C) Full model 0.052 (0.000, 0.352) 0.242 (0.000, 0.542) 22.7
aMean number of secondary cases infected by a single index case in an exposed population of size 5, CI denotes confidence interval.
bMean number of zoonotic cases in an exposed population of size 5.
cAICC denotes Akaike Information Criterion adjusted for small sample size. This indicates the percent probability that the model is the best amongst those considered.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029971.t003
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the duration of risk of more cases being detected in association
with the epizootic event. This information can guide the length of
contact tracing needed to detect and prevent further cases during
an outbreak. The findings from this study reinforce the WHO
recommendation to trace and monitor case contacts for two weeks
after the illness onset of the last case [13].
The SAR results add to the body of knowledge on typical
outbreak size associated with the current zoonotic virus, where
SAR remained approximately stable with household size. This
provides important baseline information for future outbreak
investigations and may help in the detection of changes in virus
behavior. For a virus on the verge of efficient human spread, the
household SAR should be compared to the current findings as well
as SAR for other influenza viruses.
Although the SAR remained stable with household size, the
proportion of outbreaks with more than one case increased with
household size. This highlights an important distinction between
individual and household risk for infection with the current
zoonotic virus: a person in a large household is less likely to be
infected than a person in a small household, but large households
are more likely to have a secondary case than small households.
Whether SAR was low due to virus and host characteristics or due
to public health interventions such as prophylaxis of case contacts
or isolation of cases was not explored in this study, but warrants
future investigation. Importantly, the SAR could not be calculated
for the remaining 59 outbreaks as contact data were not available
to determine the household size. The missing data highlight the
challenge in standardizing data collection for a new emerging
disease. However, as the excluded outbreaks were typically smaller
than those with full contact data (90% of excluded outbreaks were
sporadic), it seems unlikely that inclusion of those outbreaks would
increase the overall SAR or the transmission parameters. Our
sensitivity analysis suggested that inclusion of these data would
likely result in a slight decrease in the zoonotic transmission
parameter, negligible impact on the point estimate of the human
transmission parameter, and a slight decrease in the upper bound
of the human transmission parameter.
Due to the limited sensitivity of public health surveillance
systems, varied health-seeking behavior within the population and
the potential for mild infections, it is possible that cases or clusters
of H5N1 infection were missed and not included in the analysis.
This affects our findings. If sporadic cases of H5N1 infection
resulting from zoonotic transmission of the virus were missed, then
our study likely over-estimates overall SAR and transmission
parameters. If clusters of cases were missed, then our study may
under-estimate these parameters. We speculate, based on our
H5N1 case investigations, that clusters of disease are less likely to
be missed than sporadic cases of infection since families and
healthcare workers would raise alarms in the public health system
about multiple cases of pneumonia in a single household. For mild
cases, it is feasible that cases are missed, which suggests that our
results would under-estimate transmission parameters. However,
based on studies conducted amongst poultry workers exposed to
H5N1 virus in the course of their work, mild and subclinical
infections have been limited [14–16]. This is also mirrored in
influenza virological surveillance findings conducted by countries
affected by H5N1 virus such as Lao PDR, China and Cambodia,
whereby these sentinel surveillance systems regularly detect
seasonal influenza viruses circulating in the community and in
hospital settings, yet they rarely detect cases of H5N1 virus
infection [17–19].
The disease transmission model achieved a better fit when the
exposed population was restricted to blood-related household
members. The study also found that only blood relatives to the
index case developed illness and that none of the 120 non-blood
related household members (such as spouses and family-in-law)
developed illness. Collectively, these findings add evidence to the
hypothesis that there is a host genetic effect on susceptibility to AI
H5N1 infection [11]. However, since genetic relationship and
household membership are correlated, it is difficult to identify the
mechanisms most responsible for household clustering. Thus,
further research is needed to explore these findings.
Individuals at most risk of infection were those #30 years,
especially children between five and 17 years. The young age
pattern was also observed globally based on analysis of cases from
11 countries [1]. This suggests that young age groups have greater
susceptibility to AI H5N1 infection; be it due to social, hygienic or
biological factors. Potential reasons include that children are more
likely to handle sick and infected birds or to be exposed to
contaminated environment through play or through bird rearing.
In Indonesia, anecdotal evidence suggests that bird rearing is
delegated to young household members. Children are less
conscious of hygiene and thus may have had unprotected
interaction with sources of virus [20].
Household based studies exploring risk factors for infection are
less likely to be affected by case-ascertainment bias [21]. However,
since household data were not available for all outbreaks, our
analyses and conclusions were based on a restricted dataset and
should be interpreted with caution as the missing data limit the
power of our study. Nevertheless, as discussed earlier, since 90%
outbreaks lacking household data only had one case, our study
likely over-estimated the transmission parameters and the SAR,
indicating that human transmission rates were very low.
Overall, the study found that AI H5N1 human infection
resulting from human transmission of the virus was very limited,
and that the reproduction number was well below the threshold
for sustained transmission. Case clustering does not always denote
human transmission of the virus, but is often the result of
household members’ shared exposure to zoonotic sources of the
virus [22]. The study findings also suggest that there may be a host
genetic effect on susceptibility to infection, but this warrants
further investigation through epidemiological and immunological
studies to untangle the correlation between household member-
ship, shared exposures and genetics.
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
All data in this study were obtained from the case-investigation
reports and the surveillance database at the Ministry of Health,
which were collected as part of an ongoing public-health
investigation. Permission to conduct the study and analyze the
data was obtained from the data custodian (first author, Director-
General for Disease Control and Environmental Health at the
Ministry of Health, Republic of Indonesia). Data shared with
international study collaborators, who were not involved in the
case investigations, were de-identified to protect the confidentiality
of the cases and their families, whereby names and addresses were
removed. Ethics approval for the study was obtained from the
Australian National University’s Human Research Ethics Com-
mittee.
Setting
The Ministry of Health AI H5N1 case database and detailed
case investigation forms were reviewed and analyzed for cases
detected in Indonesia between July 2005 and July 2009. The study
conformed with the WHO definitions [13], whereby a cluster is a
group composed of one confirmed case of H5N1 virus infection
H5N1 Transmission Patterns
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and additional confirmed or probable cases associated with a
specific setting, with the onset of cases occurring within 2 weeks of
each other. In households with a cluster of cases, the index case
was defined as the one with the earliest symptom onset date
amongst all the cases in that household. A sporadic outbreak was
defined as one confirmed case of H5N1 virus infection. Case
definitions for probable and confirmed cases were based on the
WHO definitions described previously [23]. For both sporadic and
cluster outbreaks, a household contact was a person who had at
least four hours contact with a probable or confirmed case at home
within the seven days prior or 14 days after the case’s onset of
illness.
Data Collection
Field investigation teams investigated every outbreak. Teams
interviewed cases when possible (since many cases died before
investigation teams arrived), family members and key informants
such as healthcare workers. As described previously [8,11], data
were collected using a standardized H5N1-case questionnaire
developed by the Ministry of Health based on WHO guidance
[24]. The questionnaire collected data on the case’s household,
clinical symptoms, healthcare facility attendance and potential
zoonotic, human and environmental exposures to sources of
H5N1-virus. Medical records from all healthcare facilities visited
by cases during the course of their illness were reviewed and
extracted to complete the questionnaire.
Contact tracing, clinical examination and testing of household
contacts were done during the investigation. Serum samples were
collected from all healthy household contacts to assess for H5N1
seroconversion using microneutralization test or haemagglutina-
tion inhibition test (with horse red blood cells). For household
contacts with symptoms of H5N1 infection, nasal and throat swabs
were collected and tested using real-time reverse transcriptase
polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) test. All tests were
conducted according to the WHO guideline on recommended
laboratory procedures for H5N1 detection [25]. Healthcare
workers from the nearest government primary healthcare centre
were instructed to visit the household daily for two weeks to
monitor and detect any additional cases.
Household Study
AR, SAR, risk factors for infection and intervals between case
onsets were analyzed in a household-based study. Household size
was the number of people in the household including cases. A
household contact was a person who had at least four hours
contact with a case at home within the seven days prior or fourteen
days after a case’s onset of illness. AR was calculated for the 80
outbreaks (60 sporadic and 20 clusters) out of the 139 for which
household data were available. Data on household contacts were
missing for 59 outbreaks, of which 90% (n= 53) were sporadic case
outbreaks and the largest outbreak involved three cases. AR was
defined as the proportion of people who met the definition for
confirmed or probable AI H5N1 infection in the outbreak
(household). SAR was defined as the proportion of household
contacts who met the probable or confirmed case definition after
the onset date for the index case and within two weeks of the onset
of symptoms of a prior household case. Two weeks was selected as
the maximum follow up period based on WHO guidance [13].
The intervals (days) between onset of symptoms of index cases and
subsequent cases in clusters, and the interval between serial cases
in clusters were calculated.
Logistic regression models that accounted for household
clustering using a cluster robust standard error for the coefficients
were used to evaluate the risk factors for infection. Multivariate
models were constructed using variables significant at p = 0.1 in
the univariate analyses. A final model was achieved by sequentially
discarding terms not significant at P= 0.05 starting with the ones
with the highest P-values. We used the le Cessie-van Houwelingen-
Copas-Hosmer unweighted sum of squares goodness-of-fit test to
assess model validity, as advocated by Hosmer et al. [26–28]. Stata
software version 10.0 (StataCorp) was used for this analysis.
Four variables were explored as risk factors for infection: age,
sex, exposure type and household size. To simplify interpretation
of results, age and household size were analyzed categorically.
Categories were based on data spread; four groups for age in years
(0–4, 5–17, 18–30 and $31) and four groups for household size
(1–5, 6–10, 11–15 and .15 people). Exposure was defined as
whether the individual had direct, indirect or inconclusive
zoonotic exposure to a source of AI H5N1 virus. Direct zoonotic
exposure referred to cases who handled sick or dead poultry,
handled poultry products such as fertilizers, or who had poultry
deaths in the home. Indirect zoonotic exposure referred to cases
where poultry deaths were reported in the neighborhood, cases
where healthy poultry were present in the neighborhood and cases
who visited live bird markets. Inconclusive zoonotic exposure
refers to cases where no zoonotic source of infection could be
found despite investigation.
Transmission Model
To assess the potential for human transmission of the virus, we
used final size household models to fit the human and zoonotic
transmission parameters to outbreak data (household size, number
of cases, blood-related household members to index case) in a
manner similar to that described in van Boven et al. [29]. This
approach allows for both human and zoonotic transmission, and
enables comparison of different transmission assumptions. We
used Akaike Information Criterion adjusted for small sample size
(AICC) to select the most appropriate models. The AICC percent
support gives the probability that the model is the best model of
those considered, but does not indicate how well the suite of
models fit the data [30]. We used a simulation-based approach to
compare the data with each of the model predictions, which
allowed us to identify those models that differed significantly
(P,0.05) from the data. Matlab (version R2010b) was used for this
analysis. Our preliminary analysis indicated that density-depen-
dent transmission [31] gave a better fit to the data than frequency-
dependent transmission [29], and that assumptions concerning the
distribution of the infectious period did not affect our results. Thus,
our detailed analysis used a model with a fixed infectious period
and density-dependent transmission. Under these assumptions,
outbreak sizes will vary according to the exposed population, and
we present results for an exposed population of size five (the
median household size in the data).
Our estimation methods calculated the best-fit parameters to
cluster data consisting of the number of exposed individuals, the
number of index cases and the final outbreak size. In our initial
analysis, we used all individuals exposed for a period of four hours
or more in the household as the exposed population. In light of
evidence concerning transmission of H5N1 to blood-related
contacts [1,3], we also considered an alternative analysis in which
the exposed population was restricted to all blood relatives exposed
for a period of four hours or more in the household. Finally, we
tested the sensitivity of our results to the inclusion of those
households for which contact data were missing, by including the
missing households into the data, assuming that they had 5
household members (the median household size in the data) and 4
blood relative contacts (again, the median in the data).
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